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Abstract
This paper considers the rise of defined-contribution (DC) pensions – such as 401(k) plans – in 
order to contribute to the debate about neoliberalism. It challenges the generalizability of two 
common accounts: the weak state intervention thesis, which argues that neoliberal policy change 
is driven by state retreat and deregulation, and the state-managed transition thesis, which argues 
that neoliberal policies are both enacted and managed through new regulations. In contrast, this 
paper argues that the development of the employer-based pension system between 1970 and 
1995 is an instance of “neoliberalism without neoliberals.” A battery of regulations was passed 
between 1974 and the late 1980s that were intended to make the traditional system of defined-
benefit (DB) pensioning more secure. However, this legislation triggered a business shift to 
401(k)s. The legislation worked in such a counterintuitive way because of three factors related 
to changes in “the balance of class forces” in American society: (1) new laws increased costs for 
firms, with small businesses being hit the heaviest, (2) employment in the manufacturing sector, 
labor’s traditional stronghold, declined as a share of total employment, and (3) because unions 
were unable or unwilling to unionize emergent sectors of the economy, new businesses in them 
were not compelled to negotiate DB plans. In such a context, growing regulatory costs pushed 
many firms to adopt DC pensions for their employees. The outcome was a major policy shift, 
considered by many to be a defining feature of the neoliberal era.
Zusammenfassung
Als Beitrag zur Debatte um den Neoliberalismus befasst sich dieser Artikel mit dem Aufstieg 
der betrieblichen Altersversorgung auf Basis „garantierter Beiträge“ (defined contributions, DC) 
in den USA, wie etwa der 401(k)-Rentenpläne. Er stellt zwei weitverbreitete Auffassungen hin-
sichtlich ihrer Allgemeingültigkeit infrage: zum einen die These des schwachen, in seinen Inter-
ventionsfähigkeiten begrenzten Staates, die besagt, der Politikwechsel hin zum Neoliberalismus 
werde durch den Rückzug des Staates und die Deregulierung vorangetrieben, und zum anderen 
die des staatlich gelenkten Übergangs, die behauptet, neoliberale politische Maßnahmen wür-
den durch neue Regelungen in Kraft gesetzt und gesteuert. Demgegenüber legt diese Studie 
dar, dass die Entwicklung der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge zwischen 1970 und 1995 als ein Fall 
von „Neoliberalismus ohne Neoliberale“ bezeichnet werden kann. Von 1974 bis in die späten 
1980er-Jahre wurde eine Vielzahl von Regelungen verabschiedet, um das traditionelle Altersver-
sorgungssystem auf Basis „garantierter Leistungen“ (defined benefits, DB) sicherer zu machen. 
Doch lösten diese Gesetze vielmehr eine Umorientierung der Unternehmen zu 401(k)-Renten-
plänen aus. Drei Faktoren im Zusammenhang mit den Veränderungen des „Kräfteverhältnisses 
zwischen den Klassen“ in der US-amerikanischen Gesellschaft führten dazu, dass sich die Geset-
ze völlig anders auswirkten als erwartet. Erstens verursachten neue Gesetze Kostensteigerungen 
in Unternehmen, wobei Kleinbetriebe am stärksten betroffen waren. Zweitens sank der An-
teil der Beschäftigung im produzierenden Gewerbe, einer traditionellen Arbeiterhochburg, an 
der Gesamtbeschäftigung. Und drittens konnten oder wollten die Gewerkschaften junge Wirt-
schaftssektoren nicht gewerkschaftlich organisieren; neue Unternehmen in diesen Bereichen 
waren nicht zur Aushandlung von Altersversorgungsplänen auf Basis garantierter Leistungen 
verpflichtet. In einem solchen Kontext wurden viele Betriebe durch die steigenden regelungsbe-
dingten Kosten dazu gedrängt, für ihre Mitarbeiter eine Altersversorgung auf Basis garantierter 
Beiträge einzuführen. Die Folge war ein Politikwechsel von großer Tragweite, den viele als ein 
prägendes Merkmal der neoliberalen Ära ansehen.iv  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
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Neoliberalism without Neoliberals: Evidence from  
the Rise of 401(k) Retirement Plans
1 Introduction
George W. Bush began his second term as president by calling for a retrenchment of 
America’s Social Security program. On January 20, 2005, in his Second Inaugural Ad-
dress he declared: 
To give every American a stake in the promise and future of our country, we will … build an 
ownership society. We will widen the ownership of homes and businesses, retirement savings 
and health insurance – preparing our people for the challenges of life in a free society. By mak-
ing every citizen an agent of his or her own destiny, we will give our fellow Americans greater 
freedom from want and fear, and make our society more prosperous and just and equal. In 
America’s ideal of freedom, the public interest depends on private character – on integrity, and 
tolerance toward others, and the rule of conscience in our own lives. Self-government relies, in 
the end, on the governing of the self.
How did the Bush administration intend to achieve an ownership society? In part, it 
pushed to incorporate elements of the employer-based 401(k) system into Social Secu-
rity to partially privatize it. Under the administration’s leading proposal, eligible citi-
zens would choose from a range of investment options once the money in their Social 
Security funds reached a certain threshold. If those investments reaped windfalls, they 
could draw on them. But there was a catch. Workers alone would face the risk of loss if 
the investments failed. In the end, however, the administration could not garner enough 
support for the reform, and as a result, House Republicans left it out of the legislation 
they rolled out in the summer of 2005. 
Both the public and scholarly debate about retirement security in America has centered 
on the issue of Social Security. Long considered the “third rail” in American politics, 
it is a hot-button issue that generates an almost semi-annual outpour of commentary 
when politicians consider program cuts. However, employer pensions, America’s sec-
ond tier retirement system, have received less attention. Employer pensions account for 
a significant percentage of total retirement savings in the United States. In 2009, 45.1 
percent of retirement income was attributable to occupational pensions, a figure well 
The Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies proved a wonderful place to produce this discus-
sion paper. There Helen Callaghan, Alexander Spielau, Francesco Boldizzoni and Martin Höpner 
provided useful help on the most recent draft. I also benefitted from conversations about the work 
with Wolfgang Streeck and Thomas Paster. In addition, several others read earlier versions when I be-
gan the project at New York University. Fred Block, Jeff Goodwin, Jeff Manza, Aaron Major, and the 
participants of the Economic and Political Sociology Workshop all weighed in, Barry Eidlin helped 
locate data, and Matt Nichter suggested the title. Finally, the archivists at the George Meany Memo-
rial Archives and the Hagley Library were particularly helpful for navigating the historical records. 2  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
above the OECD average of just 19.5 percent (OECD 2009). Moreover, the numerous 
proposals considered by the Bush administration that aimed to fully or partially replace 
the guaranteed benefits provided by Social Security with personal retirement accounts 
are analogous to a change that occurred within the system of employer pensioning in 
the 1980s, when 401(k) plans gained popularity. 
401(k) retirement plans, a type of defined-contribution (DC) pension, do not guaran-
tee retirement benefit levels like their historical predecessor, defined-benefit (DB) plans. 
Instead, in DCs, the beneficiaries are responsible for making smart investment choices 
that will create a nest egg large enough to adequately supplement the retirement income 
they earn from Social Security and personal savings. The net effect of this shift toward 
DC plans is to allocate more risk to employees and less to employers (Munnell/Sundén 
2004). 
The emergence of 401(k)s is one instance among many policy changes in the 1980s that 
shifted risk onto workers and the middle class. This paper explores their rise to contrib-
ute to the debate about neoliberal policy change. Two perspectives can be drawn out of 
the research about how neoliberal policies in the period came to be. The first view char-
acterizes neoliberal change as simply the advance of the market and the retreat of the 
state. Here, ideologically driven policy makers deliberately weaken the state’s regulatory 
capacity, as occurred when Ronald Reagan cut the operating budget of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. In doing so, neoliberals allow markets to govern the distribu-
tion of goods that were once regulated or public. I call this the weak state intervention 
thesis. More recent research argues the second view that, while the neoliberal ideology 
emphasizes free markets, in practice neoliberalism is a state-managed project that actu-
ally entails forms of reregulation intended to broker in a more marketized system. I call 
this more nuanced perspective the state-managed transition thesis. 
Yet the developmental path taken by American 401(k)s is inconsistent with both the 
weak state intervention thesis and the state-managed transition thesis. Firstly, there 
were more rules being imposed on private pensions in the period, not fewer. Secondly, 
these rules were not intended by neoliberals to spur privatization. Instead of being state-
managed, the emergence and rise of 401(k)s was unintended by the policy makers in 
power at the time and in part a result of legal institutions that were established when 
unions were strong. Because it happened behind the backs of policy makers, the growth 
in the number of 401(k)s is an instance of neoliberalism without neoliberals. Regula-
tory agencies, seeking both to bolster the security of the DB system and to undermine 
unions with administrative control of their pension plans, unleashed a torrent of legis-
lation between 1974 and 1993. In the context of the increasing administrative costs of 
DB plans, a growth of small firms in the service sector and a decline in goods-producing 
industries, and the weakening of the labor movement, employers shifted into the DC 
system. While neoliberal policy makers mattered, they mattered in spite of their in-
tentions, which were motivated in part to use stronger regulations to crack down on McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  3
unions. In the case of 401(k)s, neoliberalism occurred as a business reaction to both 
increased regulatory costs, deeper changes in the country’s employment structure, and 
a weakened labor movement. 
2  Studying pension marketization
This article draws on archival data to explore the shift from DB pension plans to DC 
pension plans in the United States. I use materials from unions, businesses, and con-
gressional committees. In particular, I draw heavily from the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) unprocessed files that are 
housed at the George Meany Memorial Archives. I also draw from the materials of the 
country’s key business associations: the United States Chamber of Commerce (US-
COC), the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and the National Industrial 
Conference Board (NICB), the premiere employers’ research institution. These materi-
als are housed at the Hagley Library. In both instances the materials included subcom-
mittee reports, memoranda, studies related to pensioning, letters, speeches, literature, 
and congressional testimony.
I used two analytical strategies to make sense of the shift toward DC plans. Firstly, I 
chronicled the most important pension legislation passed between 1974 and 1996 and 
drew on archival documentation to understand how businesses, unions, and policy 
makers reacted to the new regulatory rules. Did they support it? Did it adequately deal 
with past problems in the pensioning system or did it create new ones? Secondly, I drew 
on existing statistical data compiled by economists in the 1980s and 1990s to show how 
these regulations actually worked to push employers into the DC system. I considered 
firm size, whether a firm was in the manufacturing, service or another sector of the 
economy, and whether the firm was unionized or not. Relying on studies that use IRS 
filing Form 5500, I show that smaller firms (which bore a larger regulatory burden 
in terms of administrative costs) in newer service industries, which were nonunion, 
adopted DC plans at much higher rates than their counterparts. This suggests that the 
argument that new regulations alone incentivized firm exits from DB plans into DC 
plans needs to be given greater nuance. Instead, this exit incentive was mediated by the 
“balance of class forces” because in the sectors of the American economy where unions 
remained strong, the DB system was more durable. In the liberalization of the Ameri-
can pension system, regulations mattered. How they mattered depended on the relative 
strength of business and labor in the particular firm.4  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
3  States and neoliberalism
The research on neoliberalism is clustered around two distinct lines of inquiry. One line 
asks why policy makers, both in advanced democracies and less developed countries, 
embraced an ideologically driven liberalization agenda in the 1980s and the 1990s. Why, 
in other words, did “market fundamentalism” emerge as the dominant policy-making 
paradigm, and what gave it such durable staying power (Block/Somers 2014; Bourdieu 
1998; Fourcade-Gourinchas/Babb 2002; Somers/Block 2005)? Scholars in this research 
vein identify several causal factors. The neoclassical perspective, advocated by govern-
ment agencies and state actors themselves, argues that the break with Keynesianism 
was the result of structural shifts in the global economy that made neoliberal policy 
ideas not only inevitable, but also desirable (Boix 2010). Critics also adopt this account 
by pointing to the policy imperatives of globally integrated production and financial 
markets (Callinicos 2001). Others point to the role of ideas themselves and identify how 
moral imperatives were linked up to the value of competition (Amable 2011). When 
monetarists came to occupy key state agencies and political posts, they made decisions 
guided by the efficient market hypothesis (Babb 2009). Neoliberalism, as a set of pol-
icy ideas, then came to radiate out of the United States’ superior geopolitical position 
(Blyth 2007; Bourdieu/Wacquant 1999) and was diffused globally in the 1990s (Dobbin 
et al. 2007; Henisz et al. 2005).
Finally, another perspective identifies the core cause in power relations, namely the 
business offensive in the late 1970s (Brenner 2006; Duméneil/Levy 2004; Piven/Cloward 
1997) and the breakdown of the so-called labor capital accord formed in the postwar 
period (Glyn 2006; Harvey 2005). Here, neoliberalism was the state-led restoration 
of class power. In this story, states acted both in coordination with and on behalf of 
emerging constituencies of business such as large capital (Fairbrother 2007), finance 
(Krippner 2011; Verdier 2002), and business associations like the NAM, the USCOC, 
and the Business Roundtable (Hacker/Pierson 2011).
Regardless of the ultimate cause of the rise in this ideology, most agree that free market 
views were locked in place with a set of policies dubbed the “Washington Consensus” 
(Williamson 1990). In America, transportation was deregulated as early as the 1970s 
under the Carter administration, and deregulatory measures, which sometimes took 
the form of re-regulatory policies, accelerated rapidly in the 1980s under the Reagan ad-
ministration (Albo 2002; Brenner 2006; Harvey 2005; Krippner 2011). Social scientists 
tend to agree that this policy trend dismantled and suppressed extramarket forms of 
economic coordination (Amable 2011). Taken together, the neoliberalism of the period 
can be considered a repertoire or package of policies with six long-term aims: privatiza-
tion, liberalization, separation of regulatory authority, the depoliticalization of regula-
tory authorities by insulating them from political influence, the favoring of monetary 
policy over fiscal policy, and the departure from a dirigisme approach where investment 
is subject to the winds of politics (Mudge 2008: 718; Cateno/Cohen 2012). McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  5
But another causally and historically distinct question remains: Once this ideology 
comes to dominate policy making, putting neoliberals where there were once Keynes-
ians, how do neoliberal policies themselves come to be constructed and enacted? Here 
scholars tend to support one of two views. The first, which I term the weak state inter-
vention thesis, is the default view. It presupposes a state versus market dichotomy and 
argues that the primary modality of neoliberal change is the advance of the market and 
the retreat of the state beginning around the time Reagan took office in 1980. In this 
view, neoliberalism is driven by market-oriented policy makers who deregulate, priva-
tize, and marketize distributive processes historically under public direction or weaken 
the capacities of the state’s regulatory agencies to do their job (Harvey 2005; MacEwan 
2000). This view suggests that the state’s role has been to remove rules to let competition 
work things out through the dull compulsion of the market. 
However, a second perspective, which I term the state-managed transition thesis, character-
izes neoliberalism as a political project that entails major forms of reregulation (Crouch 
2011; Krippner 2007; Major 2012; Panitch/Gindin 2012; Vogel 1996). These scholars still 
contend that the core outcome of neoliberalization is the dissolving of collective goods 
and the shifting of risk onto individuals. But in this view, neoliberal policy makers create 
new rules to manage marketization instead of simply weakening the role of the state. In 
this process, scholars suggest that neoliberalism is state managed and rife with dilem-
mas and contradictions that have to be overcome through active political intervention 
(Krippner 2007). Far from withering the state away as the weak state intervention thesis 
predicts, “freer markets” has meant “more rules” in this perspective (Vogel 1996).
The American puzzle
Pension privatization in America, the rise of DC plans in general and 401(k)s in par-
ticular, appears peculiar in the historical narratives offered in both the weak state inter-
vention thesis and the state-managed transition thesis. DC pensions increased, both in 
the number of plans and the number of workers covered, in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
a context in which state regulation over the pension system was increasing not decreas-
ing. Furthermore, these laws were not intended to broker in a marketized retirement 
system. Instead, for somewhat peculiar reasons, regulatory agencies, often staffed with 
neoliberal policy makers, passed laws that imposed heavier regulations on the tradi-
tional pension system that were intended, in part, to make it more secure. Moreover, a 
section of the labor movement, far from being marginal in this process, was quite active 
in pushing for and expanding these regulations. 
To understand the rise of the DC pension system, one needs to understand how policies 
function relative to the “balance of class forces.” In the American case, increased pension 
regulations might have made the pension system more secure had unions been strong 
enough to defend and expand the existing DB system. However, unions were not. In the 6  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
same period that they were lobbying congressional committees for a more robust regu-
latory regime to govern DB plans, their membership was hemorrhaging. In a context of 
a weakening labor movement, the increasing regulations and the larger administrative 
costs for employers with DB plans accompanying such regulations only created incen-
tives for firms to exit and for new firms to adopt DC plans instead. 
4  The ABCs of DBs and DCs
Employer retirement programs come in two broad types: DBs and DCs. In a DB plan, 
the employee’s pension benefit is preset by a formula that takes into account years of 
employment and, typically, salary or wage levels. In a DC plan, participating employees 
have a retirement account into which the employer contributes on a regular basis. If 
the program is designated as “contributory,” the employee pays into the fund as well. In 
DC plans, benefit levels are not guaranteed but instead depend on the total investment 
earnings in the account at the time the employee retires. 
DB and DC plans allocate risk to employers and employees quite differently (Bodie et al. 
1988). An employee that qualifies for a DB plan will get a set income flow until her or his 
death. In a DC plan, however, more decision-making authority is given to plan partici-
pants to determine the retirement income. The worker chooses from a limited number 
of investment options and gains access to the accumulated savings upon retirement. The 
critical difference in risk allocation is that an employee that is covered by a DB plan will 
accumulate a specified entitlement that is backed by both federal law and federal insur-
ance. A DC plan, by contrast, produces a retirement income that is determined by the 
employee’s strategic investment choices and the state of the stock market at the time of 
retirement. As a result, participants in DC plans are at a much greater risk of having lower 
replacement rates (retirement incomes relative to preretirement earnings) during their 
retirement years than those with DB plans. Figure 1 reports calculations of the National 
Retirement Risk Index (NRRI) prior to the crash in 2008. The NRRI compares replace-
ment rates for households in that year with the rates that would allow them to maintain 
their working-life standard of living and calculates the risk of falling short: the higher the 
index, the higher the risk of not being able to maintain their preretirement standard of 
living by pension type. Recalculations of the NRRI in 2012 showed a substantial increase 
in risk for future retirees after the 2008 crash (Munnell/Webb/Golub-Sass 2012). 
Prior to the 1980s, DC plans were marginal in the employer pension system, typically 
being reserved for higher paid employees. After unions won collectively bargained DB 
plans in the postwar period, such plans quickly became the norm and spread to non-
unionized sectors (McCarthy 2014). In the context of neoliberal restructuring in the 
1980s, this arrangement broke down. By the early 1990s, the number of participants in 
DB and DC plans was evenly split, and by the 2000s, DC plans had clearly become the 
private retirement vehicle of choice (see Figure 2).McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  7
401(k)s are a type of DC plan. In 1978, they were named after a section of the US Inter-
nal Revenue Code that concerns bonus payments. The (k) section was inserted into the 
code to allow employers to offer a deferred profit-sharing bonus that would go untaxed 
until the point of payment. Like all DCs, the money is put into a fund where it is in-
vested. Employees select between several stylized asset allocation combinations offered 
by fund fiduciaries. These can include short-term portfolios that invest in the money 
market, income portfolios that invest in bonds and mortgages, growth portfolios that 
invest in equities, or other portfolios that combine these approaches in different ways.1
401(k) plans were nonexistent before 1981. They rapidly grew, however, during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In 1984, they represented just 3 percent of all private plans and 4 percent of 
all DC plans. By 1998, those values were 41 percent and 45 percent, respectively (see 
Figure 3). Similarly, as a percentage of all plan participants in both DB and DC plans, 
401(k)s grew from 12 percent in 1984 to 51 percent in 1998. For just those participants 
in DC plans, 401(k)s grew from 25 percent in 1984 to 74 percent in 1998 (EBRI 2002).
1  Employers often encourage employees to invest in the stock of the sponsoring company. In the 
early 1990s, 23 percent of 401(k) assets were invested in the sponsoring firm, 32 percent in GICs 
(Guaranteed investment contracts; Blackburn 2002: 107). 
Source: Munnell/Webb/Delorme (2006).
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401(k)s and business preferences 
The shift toward 401(k)s specifically, and DC plans more broadly, was consistent with 
the vision of retirement income promoted by America’s largest business organizations, 
which emphasized individual savings. In multiple conferences and reports by busi-
ness associations such as the USCOC and NAM in the postwar period, American firms 
promoted “old-fashioned, individualistic thrift” and “old-fashioned, individualistic 
insurance.”2 In 1947, the Chamber argued that 
the primary responsibility for providing against the hazards of old age must rest with the in-
dividual. In our American system, this is a powerful incentive for personal thrift and savings, 
for the sane and orderly planning of our lives; a powerful incentive for home ownership, for 
investment, for insurance, and for working and striving to ever improve our standard of living.3
A decade later, despite collectively bargained gains that made DB plans the norm, 
these organizations pursued the same goal. According to an internal report produced 
by NAM’s Employee Health and Benefits Committee in 1958, “utmost consideration 
should be given to incentives for individuals to provide for their own security in old 
age.”4 In the same year, the USCOC held a large conference that included leaders of 
industry and prominent American academics all eager to tackle the issue of retirement 
security. From the Chamber’s perspective, its main aim was to develop momentum for 
a national shift toward individual planning for retirement.5
DC plans do not rely exclusively on individualized thrift strategies, but compared to the 
alternative, DB plans, they greatly reduce the financing burden on employers and shift 
risk onto individuals.6 So, short of being able to achieve their real goal of a personal sav-
ings-based system, business strategically preferred DC plans relative to the DB standard 
(cf. Paster 2013). Firstly, DC plans are much easier to administer because contribution 
rates are clearly defined and the benefits are in plain view. Secondly, only DB plans gen-
erate liabilities for plan sponsors that increase their default risk – the risk that the plan 
won’t have enough assets to pay out the benefits to retirees. Employers with DC plans 
are not saddled with the obligation of paying pension benefits throughout the lifetime 
2  Richard R. Tryon, Management Policy Research Associates. “Report on Pensions.” 1949. NAM 
Collection, Series 1, Box 75. See the reference list for more about the four archival collections 
cited in this paper. 
3  Conference on Employee Pension Plans. “Conference minutes.” July 9 and 10, 1947. USCOC 
Collection, Series 3, Box 6, Employee pension plans folder. 
4  Employee Health and Benefits Committee. NAM. “A Fresh Look at Retirement Security.” March 
1958. NAM Collection, Series 1, Box 274.
5  National Conference on Individual Planning for Retirement. “Conference minutes.” October 2, 
1958. USCOC Collection, Series 4, Box 4.
6  Neal F. Healy. “Clinging to Defined-Benefit Pensions Is Poor Policy.” The Wall Street Journal, Let-
ters to the Editor. September 9, 1982. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 2. Unprocessed files. 10  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
of an employee. Finally, they are flexible. In most cases, tax-sheltered savings benefits, 
including 401(k), profit-sharing, and thrift plans, can be transferred when employees 
move from one company to the next.7 
Yet for employees, DC plans create large information problems and payout risks 
(Ghilarducci 1992: 79). In DB plans, workers know exactly what their benefits will be 
when they retire. In DC plans, they don’t. Instead, retirement income depends on two 
factors: investment decisions and the market. An article in Business Week in 1989 noted 
that “instead of faceless managers deciding how pension funds get invested, employees 
choose their own course.”8 Yet economists have shown that employees are generally 
much more averse to risk than employers when thinking about pension financing, lead-
ing to smaller retirement accounts in the long run (Bodie et al. 1987). Even if employees 
invest by the book, their retirement income will be smaller if they retire in a bear market 
than if the choice to begin retirement had taken place during a bull market. In a DB 
plan, an employee’s retirement benefits are not subject to reduction if there is turbu-
lence in the stock market (Clowes 2000: 16; Munnell/Sundén 2004). 
5  Complicating the rules
The passage of new regulations is a key dimension of the neoliberal shift in retirement 
security toward DC plans. Since at least the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947, the private pension 
system has been embedded in a complex legal regime. For the most part, the main aim 
of the law was to incentivize the adoption of DB plans by offering generous tax deduc-
tions for participating firms. Yet in 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) radically revised the rules of the game. ERISA is a comprehensive law that gov-
erns all aspects of employer pensioning. After ERISA, a wave of legislation passed through 
Congress, solidifying its rules and expanding its scope. Taken together, these regulations 
on the whole have concerned DB plans to a far greater extent than DC plans (Clark/Mc-
Dermed 1990; Hustead 1998). See Table 1 for a chronological list of pension regulations, 
what type of plan the legislation effected, and what the legislation actually did. 
Prior to the establishment of ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code was the main way the 
state managed employer benefits. As early as 1914, at the height of welfare capitalism, 
Congress established favorable tax treatment of retirement plans to encourage their 
expansion.9 In actual practice, Treasury officials allowed employers to deduct contribu-
7  Greg Burns. “The Perils of Pensions.” Mature Outlook. April 1988. AFL-CIO Department of 
Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, 1994-0224, Box 9. Unprocessed files. 
8  “The New Breed of Pensions That May Leave Retirees Poorer.” Business Week. November 6, 1989. 
AFL-CIO Department of Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, 1994-0224, Box 11. Unprocessed files. 
9  Welfare capitalism is “any service provided for the comfort or improvement of employees which 
was neither a necessity of the industry nor required by law” (Brandes 1970: 5). It refers to em-McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  11
tions to retirement plans beginning in 1921, and in 1942 more changes were made to 
prevent discrimination in plan coverage (Howard 1997: 55). In 1947, the Taft–Hart-
ley Act established rules governing the allotment of employer and union seats on the 
boards of trustees of the multiemployer pension funds (noted in the table as ME). A 
decade later, the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 established 
rules on disclosing information about the plan to plan participants. However, the act 
was largely a failure. 
ployers’ voluntary provision of nonwage benefits, greater employment security, and employee 
representation.
Table 1  Main legislation regulating pensions, 1921–2001
Year Legal change Coverage type Impact on pensions
1921 Internal Revenue Code All plans Established tax incentives for plan adoption
1942 Internal Revenue Code All plans Established rules against discrimination
1947 The Taft–Hartley Act All plans Limited union administrative control, made 
ME plans joint control
1958 Federal Welfare and Pensions Plans 
Disclosure Act (amended 1962)
All plans Established rules about information disclosure 
to beneficiaries
1974 Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act
All plans Changed vesting, funding, information 
disclosure, fiduciary duties, and investment 
guidelines 
1976 Tax Reform Act All plans Changed tax deductibility requirements
1978 Revenue Act All plans Established the 401(k) option
1980 Multiemployer Pension Plans 
Amendment Act
ME plans Insured ME plans under the PBGC
1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act All plans Expanded provisions for ESOPs
1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal  
Responsibility Act
All plans Imposed penalties on top-heavy plans
1984 Retirement Equity Act All plans Required joint-and-survivor annuity as the 
default annuity
1986 Tax Reform Act All plans Established minimum coverage and nondis-
crimination tests, redefined “highly compen-
sated employee,” changed minimum vesting 
standards, and new integration rules
1986 Single-Employer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act
SE plans Raised insurance premiums to deal with PBGC 
deficits
1987  Pension Protection Act DB plans Increased minimum funding requirements, 
reduced maximum tax deductible contribu-
tion, and raised PBGC premiums 
1996 Small Business Job Protection Act All plans Liberalized and simplified nondiscrimination 
standards
1997 Taxpayer Relief Act Public plans Exempted government plans from nondis-
crimination standards
2001 Economic Growth and Taxpayer 
Relief Reconciliation Act
All plans Raised pretax contribution limits for most 
plans
Notes: ME=multi-employer pension funds; PBGC=Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation; ESOP=employee 
stock ownership plan; SE = single employer.12  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
Business groups opposed the bill, arguing that the behaviors that Congress was trying 
to minimize were largely confined to union-run, multiemployer plans instead of the 
single-employer plans that represented the larger amount of participants. As pension 
expert Dan McGill writes, “To persuade the business community to accept application 
of the law to all employer plans, investigative and enforcement powers originally in-
tended for the Department of Labor were removed” (McGill et al. 2005: 82). 
Firms faced relatively small operating costs prior to ERISA. In fact, most of the postwar 
legislation concerning the pension system was passed with business interests in mind by 
providing tax incentives for firms with plans. But ERISA’s passage in 1974 established a 
comprehensive and complicated set of regulations to govern the administration of the 
plans, and subsequent changes in the law only complicated it further. In the following, I 
explore the regulations that govern pensions. In particular, I will consider the regulatory 
costs imposed on those that design, administer, and provide services for plans, and the 
incentives, usually through the tax code, that make private plans attractive to sponsors. 
I show how regulations and taxation policies developed, how they distributed adminis-
trative costs to smaller firms, and who supported and resisted them. 
The politics of pension regulation
Although ERISA was passed in 1974, some of its core provisions had been debated since 
the Eisenhower administration when policy makers put forward draft versions of it. 
Unlike other pieces of legislation, such as the Taft–Hartley Act, businesses and unions 
were never neatly divided over it. There was just as much division within labor and 
business as there was between them (Wooten 2004). In multiemployer plans, unions re-
tained more administrative control and therefore resisted regulations because of poten-
tial costs they would incur. Unions that sponsored multiemployer plans were generally 
hostile to the legislation.10 These included the Garment Workers, the Textile Workers, 
the Teamsters, the Mine Workers and various building and construction trades unions, 
among others. In single-employer plans, the opposite was true. Unions such as the 
United Auto Workers and the United Steel Workers were the most vocal advocates for 
increased regulations on the pension system, while employers in these industries most 
staunchly resisted them (McCarthy forthcoming). 
10  Either the union bargains directly with single, large employers on behalf of the employer’s em-
ployees, or bargaining is industry-wide, between many small employers and the union-rep-
resented employees of an industry. In the former case, single-employer pension plans are the 
norm. Here fund management is the responsibility of one firm and one union. In the latter 
case, multi-employer plans emerge. Here fund management is the responsibility of many small 
employers and one, typically large, union. McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  13
After President Kennedy created The President’s Committee on Corporate Pension 
Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs in 1962, it recommended 
regulatory reforms such as federal minimum vesting and funding standards to ensure 
that plan participants would receive their benefits. At the time, Anthony Boyle, presi-
dent of the United Mine Workers union, argued that “the proposed report to the Presi-
dent is based on the erroneous concept that Government specification of standards 
in private pension plans can be mandated by public law to a similar extent that such 
standards are fixed by law in public pension plans.” The United Mine Workers primar-
ily relied on multiemployer pension plans. Even George Meany, president of the AFL-
CIO, objected to vesting and funding requirements for multiemployer plans when it 
was suggested by Kennedy’s committee because of the division it would create within 
the federation between unions with single-employer plans and those with multiem-
ployer plans (Wooten 2004: 109). The proposal triggered significant opposition from 
businesses as well, primarily those with single-employer plans that bore the administra-
tive burden (Wooten 2004; McGill et al. 2005: 84). However, those unions that relied on 
single-employer plans, such as the United Auto Workers and the United Steel Workers, 
actively supported the legislation and continued to make it a priority in the congres-
sional committees where they testified. 
With another flurry of congressional interest in pension reform, this division arose in 
the public debate once again in 1967. That year the AFL-CIO Executive Council drafted 
a policy that opposed pension reform. According to ERISA scholar James Wooten, 
[i]n a collectively bargained single-employer plan, the union usually played little or no role in 
plan administration. This made pension reform the employer’s problem. In a multiemployer 
plan, the union usually controlled the plan administration, so pension reform was the union’s 
problem. The difference between single-employer and multiemployer plans explains why much 
of the analysis in the draft policy statement might have come from the Chamber of Commerce 
or the National Association of Manufacturers.  (2004: 140)
In fact, it was so rare for a multiemployer plan to support increased pension regula-
tions that when the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America decided 
to prior to the passage of ERISA, Bert Seidman, director of the AFL-CIO Department 
of Social Security, made a special note of it in congressional testimony, saying, “To my 
knowledge this is the first time that a building trades union has endorsed vesting and 
funding standards.”11
Despite opposition from the unions with multiemployer plans, however, the interests 
of single-employer unions came to dominate the AFL-CIO by the 1970s. When pension 
reform was debated again during that decade, the federation leadership supported it. 
11  James F. Bailey, Legislative Advocate, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. 
“On H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 Pension Reform Bills.” General Subcommittee on Labor of the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor US House of Representatives. March 6, 1973. AFL-CIO Depart-
ment of Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, Box 38, Folder 37. 14  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
Initially, in 1973, when the legislation was making its way through the House, multiem-
ployer unions again tried to hold it up. But the standoff broke when the United Steel 
Workers threatened a “reevaluation of its position as an affiliate of the AFL-CIO” if the 
legislation was not supported by the federation as a whole. Under the threat of a federa-
tion split, AFL-CIO President George Meany was spurred to inform Congress that the 
AFL-CIO supported the bill (Wooten 2004: 230-233).
ERISA was signed into law in 1974 by President Ford. In a meeting over pension regula-
tion in the early 1980s, unions in the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation agreed that 
the best way to make the pension system more secure was to tighten and expand the 
rules, and time after time during the decade they mobilized their political power to do 
so.12 Lawrence Smedley, director of the Department of Occupational Safety, Health, and 
Social Security said in 1987 that “like most laws, it is not perfect. Though we are dissatis-
fied with a number of its provisions and with some aspects of its administration, we still 
feel the law is beneficial and support its basic provisions.”13 
ERISA established a comprehensive package of federal minimum standards for em-
ployer-provided pension plans. While it does not make employer pensions mandatory, 
those companies that do adopt them must meet certain requirements concerning infor-
mation disclosure about plan features and funding, fiduciary standards for asset invest-
ments that include transaction prohibitions, minimum standards for participation, and 
vesting and funding standards. It also guarantees a payment of certain retirement ben-
efits through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federally chartered 
corporation, if a DB plan is terminated by the sponsoring employer. Since its passage, 
ERISA has become “one of the business community’s worst regulatory headaches.”14 
Somewhat unintentionally, ERISA mobilized businesses to become more involved in is-
sues related to pensioning because of the costs it imposed on them. The USCOC, NAM, 
the American Council of Life Insurance, and the American Bankers Association all in-
creased their involvement in policy discussions after its passage. Led by the National 
Federation of Independent Business, an association that represents small businesses, 
they lobbied to roll back many of the regulations ERISA put on the private system 
(Howard 1997: 133).
12  AFL-CIO Department of Legislation. Memo on ERISA. February, 3 1983. AFL-CIO Collection, 
1984, Box 4. Unprocessed files. 
13  Statement by Lawrence T. Smedley, Associate Director AFL-CIO Department of Occupational 
Safety, Health and Social Security. At the Joint Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor 
and the House Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations on Administration Proposals 
for the Funding and Termination of Defined Benefit Pension Plans. March 24, 1987. AFL-CIO 
Department of Legislations. AFL-CIO Collection, 1994-0224, Box 11. Unprocessed files.
14  Diane Hal Gropper. “The Ordeal of Jeffrey Clayton.” Institutional Investor. August 1982. Social 
Security Department. AFL-CIO Collection, 85-0036, Box 1. Unprocessed files.McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  15
Business countermobilized against the rules because ERISA requires a large commit-
ment of their resources to administrative and technical matters that concern their DB 
pension plans. Many firms threatened that they would stop offering pensions to their 
workers altogether if the legislation remained intact. According to business testimony 
at the Department of Labor (one of the agencies in charge of enforcing ERISA), “The 
question … is whether the rules can be simplified and even in some cases eliminated in 
order to reduce the possibility that employers will decide not to adopt qualified plans or 
even to terminate plans that they have been maintaining.”15 
Even prolabor politicians, although they supported tightening the regulations, ac-
knowledged the problems that ERISA generated in the years after its passage. According 
to congressional testimony from Claude Pepper, a Florida Democrat and chairman of 
the House Select Committee on Aging, 
[m]any of the problems associated with the funding of retirement benefits are related to the 
nature, operation, and regulation of a defined-benefit plan under [ERISA]. This involves not 
only the organic provisions of this law but the regulation and enforcement of the federal agen-
cies, the Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, which administer the provisions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code which 
apply to employee pension benefit plans.16 
ERISA’s provisions
ERISA contains five core areas of concern for businesses, unions, and future retirees. 
Firstly, the law establishes disclosure provisions that vastly strengthen the ineffectual 
ones included in the Federal Welfare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act. Under these 
rules, plan sponsors must report much more detailed information about their funds’ 
investments to the Department of Labor, who with the IRS is in charge of overseeing 
the vesting and funding provisions (Brooks 1975: 11). Almost immediately, firms and 
business associations came out in opposition of the so-called “paperwork burden,” and 
many reported a “deeply felt hostility to paperwork requirements.”17 This was costly for 
15  Andrew H. Cox, Esq. “The Impact of ERISA and Related Legislation on the Development of 
Private Retirement Plans.” The Department of Labor ERISA Advisory Council on Employee 
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans. March 15, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and 
Social Security. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files.
16  Claude Pepper, Chairman. “Briefing on Problems in Pension Funding and Guarantees.” June 
7, 1982. House Select Committee on Aging. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and Social 
Security. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011 Box 2. Unprocessed files.
17  Michael S. Gordon. “Policy Forum: Reflections on Selected Issues of Private Pension Regula-
tion.” National Journal. August 11, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and Social Se-
curity. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files. 16  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
business in terms of both time and expenses.18 Its passage resulted in “strenuous efforts 
to eliminate or curtail reports, simplify them for small plans, and remove certain annual 
audit requirements.”19
Secondly, ERISA’s section 404(1)(a) requires that pension fund fiduciaries manage a 
plan “for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants.” Although this 
principle was not entirely new, the act heightened the awareness of those likely to assert 
complaints about plans sponsors and increased the capacity of the aggrieved to formal-
ly make them. This increased employer liability by easing jurisdictional and procedural 
access to courts, broadening court remedies to violations, giving courts discretionary 
authority to award litigation costs, making fiduciaries personally liable, and making 
plan operations more visible through disclosure provisions.20 Like those above, these 
rules have been criticized as being too restrictive by business and those in the pension 
community.21
Thirdly, ERISA established the PBGC, which guarantees against losses in DB plans (but 
not DC plans) that are terminated. This termination insurance created a regulatory 
dilemma. For employers remaining in the DB system, ERISA uses insurance premiums 
that sponsors have to pay to the PBGC to subsidize unfunded plan benefits that solvent 
employers could afford to fund more generously. According to a corporate fund man-
ager at the time, 
[e]fforts to make the regulatory structure more equitable by expanding an employer’s post-
withdrawal or post-termination funding responsibilities – the former in the case of the multi-
employer amendments of 1980, the latter in the case of the proposed single employer insurance 
legislation – make defined benefit plans considerably less attractive to employers.22
Fourthly, the law prohibits certain kinds of transactions. In particular, it imposes re-
strictions on sales, exchanges, lending, or furnishing of goods and services between the 
plan and parties of interest such as the sponsoring employer, the union, or the plan 
fiduciaries. For instance, it restricts plans from investing in the stock of the sponsoring 
18  Andrew H. Cox, Esq. “The Impact of ERISA and Related Legislation on the Development of 
Private Retirement Plans.” The Department of Labor ERISA Advisory Council on Employee 
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans. March 15, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and 
Social Security. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files.
19  Michael S. Gordon. “Policy Forum: Reflections on Selected Issues of Private Pension Regula-
tion.” National Journal. August 11, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and Social Se-
curity. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files.
20  Jeffrey D. Mamorsky and Lee T. Polk. “Indemnification and Fiduciary Liability Insurance.” Pen-
sion World. August 1976. AFL-CIO Social Security Department. AFL-CIO Collection, 85-0036, 
Box 1. Unprocessed files.
21  Michael S. Gordon. “Policy Forum: Reflections on Selected Issues of Private Pension Regula-
tion.” National Journal. August 11, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and Social Se-
curity. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files. .
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company. However, it does not completely prohibit it: plans can invest up to 10 percent 
of their assets into the sponsor’s stock (Brooks 1975: 55–6). This is illustrative of the 
complexity of the rules. Furthermore, with most plans, lawyers spend the majority of 
their time on transaction rules, which makes it a costly aspect of the code for plan ad-
ministrators.23 Since no one has the perfect formula for regulating conflicts of interest, 
regulators err on the side of extra safeguards. Although the business community has 
expended significant effort to soften prohibited transaction rules, its efforts were unsuc-
cessful throughout the 1980s. 
Finally, ERISA imposes minimum funding requirements on DB plans (by their nature, 
DC plans are always fully funded and are therefore not subject to these rules). These 
mandate that employers contribute the normal costs of the plan plus amortization of 
past service liabilities into a “funding standard account.” Every year, the employer is re-
quired to contribute the necessary amount to achieve a targeted fund value. Before the 
enactment of ERISA, only minimum funding rules existed. For those employers with 
underfunded plans, these new rules were an unwelcomed change. As a result, many 
participants lost their benefits when their underfunded plans were terminated by their 
employers.24
Pension regulations after ERISA
When Reagan took office in 1980, it was rumored that he would ask for a repeal of 
ERISA. That didn’t happen. Although the 1980s are widely recognized as a period of 
state-managed deregulation, that trend did not extend to pension legislation. Even Jef-
frey Clayton, a conservative Mormon from Utah appointed by Reagan to the Pension 
and Welfare Benefit Program in the Department of Labor, the position in charge of 
enforcing ERISA, took a middle-road approach saying that “we’ll deregulate where pru-
dent. But to protect plans from abuse, we have to be tougher in enforcing the meaning-
ful provisions of ERISA.”25 
23  Andrew H. Cox, Esq. “The Impact of ERISA and Related Legislation on the Development of 
Private Retirement Plans.” The Department of Labor ERISA Advisory Council on Employee 
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans. March 15, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and 
Social Security. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files.
24  Joseph F. Delfico, Director, Income Security Issues in the U.S. General Accounting Office. “Most 
Underfunded Plan Sponsors Are Not Making Additional Contributions.” April 20, 1993. Tes-
timony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee of the Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, 1996-0010, Box 3. 
Unprocessed files.
25  Diane Hal Gropper. “The Ordeal of Jeffrey Clayton.” Institutional Investor. August 1982. Social 
Security Department. AFL-CIO Collection, 85-0036, Box 1. Unprocessed files.18  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
For rather peculiar reasons, Clayton and other Reagan-era conservatives faced a “di-
lemma of enforcement” in the decade that followed. On the one hand, following busi-
ness demands, neoliberals wanted to roll back some of the regulatory provisions that 
disproportionately placed burdens on employers. Along these lines, Clayton and his 
staff at the Department of Labor proposed several changes to the ERISA legislation, 
including easing prohibited transactions, simplifying plan asset guidelines, and reduc-
ing paperwork. He went as far as to put together a “paperwork reduction taskforce” to 
reduce the administrative burden of the lengthy reporting Form 5500. Many of these 
goals, however, went unrealized.26 
On the other hand, the law gave neoliberals a legitimate means to pursue an antilabor 
agenda. In particular, it granted the state the regulatory capacity to rein in the multiem-
ployer unions that had gained some control over their funds.27 Because of their antila-
bor orientation, neoliberals saw these rules as, on balance, beneficial, despite business 
opposition. Along these lines, neoliberal policy makers ramped up the enforcement of 
these provisions under the Reagan administration. Just a few years after its passage dur-
ing the Carter administration, ERISA was used as justification for the government tak-
ing over the Teamsters’ Central States Pension Fund (McCarthy forthcoming). When 
Reagan appointees were put into the Department of Labor, they wanted an even stron-
ger enforcement of the rules. 
Donald Dotson, who worked under Clayton at the Department of Labor, said candidly, 
“The DOL’s record on protecting and recovering plan assets has not been good.” Con-
servative members of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released 
a report in 1981 specifically saying that the department had not acted strongly enough 
in several cases related to union pension funds, including the Teamsters’ Central States 
Pension Fund. Similarly, in the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 
Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), argued that the Department of Labor had not en-
forced the criminal or civil provisions of ERISA strongly enough on union funds. Far 
from weakening the law or the Department of Labor, neoliberals, in their words, wanted 
to make it “a better policeman.”28
26  The Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs in the Department of Labor shouldered a dispro-
portionately large share of the budget cuts imposed on the Labor Management Services Admin-
istration by the Reagan administration because it had lost out in the political battles with rival 
programs in the department. Its chief adversary, the program of Labor Management Standards 
Enforcement (LMSE), the department’s only other enforcement arm, is widely viewed as having 
gained the upper hand in influence and resources. As a monitor of union elections and audi-
tor of union books, LMSE enforces the anticorruption provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 
which regulated internal union affairs (Diane Hal Gropper. “The Ordeal of Jeffrey Clayton.” 
Institutional Investor. August 1982. Social Security Department. AFL-CIO Collection, 85-0036, 
Box 1. Unprocessed files).
27 Ibid.
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The key point is that neither the changing political winds, the rise of a neoliberal ideol-
ogy, nor the comprehensiveness of ERISA slowed the expansion of the regulatory activ-
ity governing pensions in the 1980s. Unions with single-employer plans, who had no 
administrative capacity over their funds, saw new rules as a way to make their own plans 
more secure, and progressives in Congress generally followed their lead by supporting 
stronger regulations. However, pension regulations were Janus-faced. While the neolib-
erals in Congress did want to remove some of those regulations, higher costs for some 
businesses had benefits for neoliberals that hindered the momentum for liberalization. 
Regulations allowed the state to weaken unions in industries that relied on multiem-
ployer plans. As Table 1 shows, the semiannual passage of pension legislation (annual 
between some years) both expanded the scope of existing rules and generated entirely 
new ones. The speed in which plan designs were changed and the emergence of deficien-
cies in the existing regulatory regime led to the congressional tendency to revise and 
amend throughout the decade. Legislators were on a path-dependent track and found 
themselves, to use Lindblom’s phrase, “muddling through” unintended problems (1959).
As part and parcel of this trend, tax policy regarding plan qualification guidelines see-
sawed between favorable and unfavorable provisions, thereby creating significant un-
certainty for cost-averse firms. After the passage of ERISA, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation noted that “the Federal laws and regulations governing employer-provided 
retirement benefits are recognized as among the most complex set of rules applicable to 
any area of the tax law” (cited in Howard 1997: 132). Far from being streamlined during 
the 1980s, the tax code only became more difficult to comprehend. 
Firms applauded when the tax advantages for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 
which were established in ERISA for those without access to an employer pension, were 
expanded significantly in 1981. IRAs were Reagan’s favored market-based alternative 
to the Social Security program. However, fiscal and political pressures on the state to 
reduce the deficit eventually led to provisions that rolled back tax incentives for all types 
of retirement plans. The first of these was the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 1982, which imposed penalties on top-heavy plans – those that primarily provided 
pensions for top-tier employees. These penalties were made more stringent in the 1987 
Pension Protection Act, and in 1986 eligibility for tax-exempt IRAs was made more 
restrictive. Nearly 30 percent of those previously eligible either lost their eligibility en-
tirely or saw their tax incentives scaled back (Hacker 2002: 162). 
The largest changes to the tax code concerning pensions were written into the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, which significantly revised the Internal Revenue Code. The act con-
tinued to exclude pension contributions and trust income from taxation. A coalition 
of insurance companies, business groups, and unions with political clout were intent 
on retaining the tax-free status of their plans (Hacker 2002: 161), but because the act 
significantly revised ERISA, almost every qualified pension plan had to be amended. 20  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
Just a year later, the Pension Protection Act of 1987 increased minimum funding re-
quirements, reduced maximum tax-deductible contributions, and further increased 
PBGC premiums.29 The act’s authors intended to push companies to fully fund their 
plans. Instead, the percentage of plans paying the PBGC’s variable rate premium be-
cause of their underfunded status increased from 17 percent in 1989 to 23 percent in 
1991. During the same period, the underfunded amount in plans insured by PBGC 
increased from $30 billion to over $50 billion.30 As a result of these changes, the largest 
cost increases in both absolute and relative terms of administering DB versus DC plans 
occurred in the late 1980s (Hustead 1998). 
By the middle of the 1990s, policy makers were made aware of the fact that pension 
coverage was stagnant overall and declining for DB plans. As a percentage of the private 
workforce, coverage had remained the same since the passage of ERISA. To counter this 
trend, legislators argued that it was necessary to dismantle the large regulatory wall that 
had been built up around DB plans. But by then, many firms had already adopted DC 
plans, making any hope of salvaging the DB system a case of too little too late. None-
theless, in 1996, the Small Business Job Protection Act greatly simplified and liberalized 
discrimination standards and the Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997 then extended the non-
discrimination exemptions to government plans. 
6  How regulations triggered neoliberal policy change
The result of the wave of new laws was a general increase in the administrative costs of 
operating a retirement plan up to 1996 when the legal regime was subject to deregula-
tion under Clinton. On balance, however, the regulatory changes after ERISA did not fall 
equally on DC and DB plans. Several requirements, such as those concerning minimum 
participation and funding, only apply to DB plans. Other requirements under the In-
ternal Revenue Code might include certain types of DC plans, such as money purchase 
plans, but primarily relate to DB plans (McGill et al. 2005: 94). Congress also repeatedly 
raised PBGC premiums during the 1980s and imposed an excise tax on employers who 
claimed the excess assets of terminated defined-benefit plans (Munnell/Sundén 2004: 
26). DC plans, alternatively, do not pay premiums to the PBGC for pension insurance 
and by their very design are incapable of having “excess assets.” The regulatory costs for 
DB and DC plans that accumulated between 1981 and 1996 were estimated by Hustead 
29  “Facciani & Company Memorandum.” March 28, 1988. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation. 
AFL-CIO Collection, 1994-0224, Box 9. Unprocessed files.
30  Joseph F. Delfico, Director, Income Security Issues in the U.S. General Accounting Office. “Most 
Underfunded Plan Sponsors Are Not Making Additional Contributions.” April 20, 1993. Tes-
timony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee of the Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, 1996-0010, Box 3. 
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(1996). On average, he found that the cost of administering a DB plan in 1981 was ap-
proximately 140 percent higher than administering a DC plan. By 1996, the relative cost 
had grown to approximately 210 percent. 
Furthermore, smaller plans disproportionately felt the regulatory burden relative to 
plans that covered larger numbers of beneficiaries. As shown in Figure 4, costs for small-
er plans, especially those operating as DB, increased dramatically in the 1980s – with 
the largest increase in administrative costs occurring after the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
Per capita costs decrease with more participants because of economies of scale, but the 
legislation included several requirements that were particularly burdensome for small 
firms operating a DB plan. The withdrawal liability established by the Multiemployer 
Act in 1980 disproportionately affected small plans and, according to business testi-
mony at the Department of Labor, “has a very negative impact on the adoption of mul-
tiemployer plans by new employers.”31 Furthermore, provisions aimed to reduce top-
31  Andrew H. Cox, Esq. “The Impact of ERISA and Related Legislation on the Development of 
Private Retirement Plans.” The Department of Labor ERISA Advisory Council on Employee 
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans. March 15, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and 
Social Security. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files. 
Figure 4  Annual per capita pension administration costs in 1996 dollars
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heavy plans in the tax reforms of both 1982 and 1986 also disproportionately affected 
small plans. Top-heavy plans, as established by the 1982 Act, are plans where more than 
60 percent of the accounts or accrued benefits are attributable to employees at the top 
of the internal job ladder. These regulations reduced incentives for small businesses to 
adopt or maintain DB plans (Olsen/VanDerhei 1997). 
In addition to the existing administrative costs, business anticipated increased future 
costs. During the 1980s, political signs suggested that the cost burden would only get 
heavier. In the 1970s, Congress was indifferent to pension funds because a lethargic 
stock market had left many employers scrambling just to meet ERISA funding levels. 
But congressional interest was aroused when a bull market in the 1980s infused pension 
funds with assets.32 As Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob Dole (R-Kansas) said 
at the time, 
[t]ax-free benefits have been growing at a much faster rate than taxable wages … To the extent 
narrowing the tax base causes pressure to increase marginal tax rates, these tax-free benefits will 
only appear to be free, because ultimately every taxpayer will have to pay for them in the form 
of higher taxes on the portion of his compensation that is subject to taxes.33
Congress wanted some of the pension money. 
According to Howard C. Weizmann, executive director of the Association of Private 
Pension and Welfare Plans, a trade group in Washington, “This magnificent system is 
in jeopardy because Congress is undermining it.”34 By the end of the 1980s, businesses 
were expecting Congress to launch an all-out assault on the tax-exempt status of retire-
ment plans. In the words of a 1989 Business Week article, that “would kill employer-
paid plans.” Congress debated several reforms in the late 1980s: legislation that would 
make it harder for employers to engage in reversions, joint-trustees on single-employers 
plans, increased taxation, and an age-discrimination regulation. As Weizmann noted, 
“What we’re seeing is a battle for control of pension assets between labor, employers, 
and the government.”35 The net result was fewer employer-sponsored plans – a some-
what inevitable result of the growing institutional complexity of regulations and their 
increased administrative burdens on a system that is voluntary.36
32  “The Power of Pension Funds.” Business Week. November 6, 1989. AFL-CIO Department of 
Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, 1994-0224, Box 11. Unprocessed files.
33  Martha M. Hamilton. “Hill, Budgeteers to Look at Fringe Benefits.” Washington Post. August 12, 
1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and Social Security. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, 
Box 10. Unprocessed files.
34  “The Power of Pension Funds.” Business Week. November 6, 1989. AFL-CIO Department of 
Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, 1994-0224, Box 11. Unprocessed files.
35 Ibid.
36  Andrew H. Cox, Esq. “The Impact of ERISA and Related Legislation on the Development of 
Private Retirement Plans.” The Department of Labor ERISA Advisory Council on Employee 
Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans. March 15, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and 
Social Security. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files.McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  23
According to 1994 congressional testimony from the American Society of Pension Ac-
tuaries, 
[s]ince 1982, continual change of the rules under which qualified retirement plans operate has 
been a major deterrent to employers adopting and maintaining these plans. As a consequence, 
the percentage of employees covered under qualified retirement plans has decreased during the 
last decade.37
Many firms that remained in the DB system due to obligations in the late 1980s and ear-
ly 1990s underfunded plans as a way to defer costs, taking what U.S. Secretary of Labor 
Robert Reich called a “contribution holiday” at the time.38 Unfunded liabilities doubled 
between 1987 and 1992, growing from $27 billion to $53 billion. This underfunding was 
concentrated in those industries most likely to have union-negotiated, single-employer 
DB plans such as steel, auto, manufacturing, and airlines.39
Class power as a mediating factor
Yet, do increased regulatory costs alone explain this shift toward DC plans? If this was 
the only dynamic at work, we should see a uniform shift away from DB plans among all 
employer types. However, data suggests a number of things that make the story more 
causally nuanced. Firstly, the shift did not primarily result from employers with DB 
plans terminating them and replacing them with DC plans (see Figure 5). Consider-
ing the net change in plan participants between 1985 and 1993, there were about 3.7 
million fewer employees with a DB plan and almost 18.4 million more with a DC plan, 
which shows that reversions were not the primary cause of the shift (see Kruse 1995). 
Secondly, the largest increases in DC plan participants occurred disproportionately in 
smaller pension plans. In fact, in large plans, those that covered ten to twenty thousand 
participants, the number of DB plan participants actually increased more than DC plan 
participants. This trend is only intensified when the unit of analysis is plans rather than 
participants. As Figure 6 reports, almost all of the new DC plans were adopted in firms 
that had 249 or fewer employees.40
37  American Society of Pension Actuaries. “Comments of the American Society of Pension Actuar-
ies on The Retirement Protection Act of 1993 H.R. 3396.” House Ways and Means Committee, 
April 19, 1994. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation. AFL-CIO Collection, 1996-0010, Box 3. 
Unprocessed files.
38 Ibid. 
39  Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor. Testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means, United 
States House of Representatives. April 19, 1994. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation. AFL-CIO 
Collection, 1996-0010, Box 3. Unprocessed files.
40  It may appear peculiar in Figure 5 that in very large plans with twenty thousand or more plan 
participants, participants in DB plans declined so drastically. There were well over a million 
fewer participants in these kinds of plans. Despite this large decline, it is surprising that there 
was only a net loss of 8 plans of this size in the same period, as is barely visible in Figure 6. This 24  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
Change in the “balance of class forces” is a critical mediating factor that explains the 
way the regulations impacted the pension system over the period. It is now well know 
that shifts in the employment structure favored a large growth in service sector work 
in the 1970s and 1980s and a decline in manufacturing as a share of total employment. 
Goods-producing industries were already in decline by the passage of ERISA in 1974, 
and the share of service industries – usually smaller, owner-run businesses that tended 
to employ younger, female, and part-time workforces – began to increase as early as the 
postwar period. 
Manufacturing jobs were once American labor’s stronghold (Goldfield 1987: 126). As 
Figure 7 shows, although union density in goods-producing firms declined over the pe-
riod, from about 30 percent in 1983 to 16 percent in 2002, it was always higher than the 
density in the services sector. While the services sector grew rapidly after 1983, Figure 
7 also reports that unions were unable to organize a meaningful percentage of those 
new employees in response. However, even in the goods-producing industries where 
suggests that much of this loss in participants was driven by only a few very large plans closing 
their doors. 
Figure 5  Net change in participants in primary plan by plan size, 1985–1993
Plan size = number of employees in a firm covered by a group plan.
Source: EBRI (2002); data drawn from Form 5500 filed with the Internal Revenue Service.
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they had made historic gains, unions faced absolute declines in worker coverage. Over 
the period of the 1980s and 1990s, union density went into decline across most sectors 
(with the special exception of the public sector).
Like regulatory costs, this structural shift toward services might appear at first glance 
to be the main reason why we see the growth of DCs and the weakening of traditional 
pensions. In other words, is it possible that the regulations of the period did not ulti-
mately matter and that firms would have chosen DC plans regardless? Two points sug-
gest that a structural explanation alone would also be incomplete. On the one hand, to 
focus only on structural changes fails to explain timing. There is no substantive shift 
toward DC plans until the 1980s, long after the marked increase in services relative to 
the goods-producing sectors in the employment share. Although the growth in services 
accelerated in the 1970s, there had been a gradual move of the economy in the direc-
tion of services since at least the 1950s. On the other hand, if structural factors are all 
that matter for plan adoption, then traditional plans should have never been dominant. 
From the postwar period on, services always accounted for a greater share of employ-
Figure 6  Net change in number of plans by plan size, 1985–1993
Plan size = number of employees in a firm covered by a group plan.
Source: EBRI (2002); data drawn from Form 5500 filed with the Internal Revenue Service.
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ment than goods-producing industries. Even in the beginning of the 1980s, over 30 
million more people worked in services than they did in goods-producing sectors (see 
Figure 7). However, the dominance of this sector prior to the 1980s did not lead to the 
dominance of DC-type plans in the same period. In short, if sectoral trends alone ex-
plained the rise of DC plans, we should have seen them much sooner, and they should 
have always been dominant. Instead, the interactive effects of regulatory costs and class 
power must be highlighted. 
Labor was in retreat during the period. Union density in the 1970s fell by a fifth, with 
the share of the unionized workforce dropping from 26 percent to 20 percent of the to-
tal workforce. In the 1980s, it fell another 5.4 percent. Depending on the study, research-
ers believe that structural factors like the shift toward services account for 20 percent 
to 60 percent of the decrease in union density since the postwar period. Even with no 
change in the absolute number of union members, union density would have declined 
Figure 7  Sectoral employment and union coverage trends, 1983–2002
Source: Hirsch/Macpherson (2014), data drawn from the Current Population Survey.
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if unions had remained strong in the goods-producing sectors of the economy that were 
shrinking (Clawson/Clawson 1999: 98). However, Western’s comparative analysis shows 
that union decline in the period was not driven exclusively by these structural changes; 
unions were also weakened in the sectors where they were strongest, such as manufac-
turing (1997: 145).41 
Employers had become especially hostile to unions in the early 1970s, when many firms 
faced declining profit rates (Brenner 2003). Employers were further politically embold-
ened to oppose unions when Reagan broke the air traffic controllers strike in 1981. In 
the next decade, businesses aggressively sped up production, fired union organizers, 
hired antiunion consultancy firms to protect themselves against organizers, delayed and 
disputed National Labor Relations Board rulings, and threatened to relocate produc-
tion to push unions to make concessions (Brenner et al 2010; Bronfenbrenner et al. 
1998; Cowie 2001; Fantasia 1988; Goldfield 1987). In short, firms resisted unionization 
to a greater degree than they had done since the postwar period. 
After World War II, unions were a key force in both the establishment and spread of the 
DB pension system (McCarthy 2014). Once collective bargaining was made mandatory 
by the Supreme Court in 1947, all unions had to do was pressure employers into agree-
ments. However, when union strength began to wane and employers were free to run 
their businesses without labor interference, the latter had less reason to be concerned 
with which plan was best for workers. In a context of weakening of union strength, 
employers in the new sectors that were being disproportionately hit by administrative 
costs were free to ignore union demands for DB plans. As a result, firms in emergent 
sectors of the economy simply adopted DC plans, which were increasingly 401(k)s. 
By 1993, just 21 percent of all contributions to DC plans were provided by employers 
with unionized employees and 79 percent were employers with nonunion workforces 
(Olsen/VanDerhei 1997: 26).42 Had union density been the only factor that mattered to 
plan adoption, like the structural shifts toward the services, again we would not be able 
to explain timing. Union density in America had been in decline since the mid-1950s. 
But during that decade and the next, traditional plans were becoming more popular, 
not less. Instead, regulatory costs increased adoption disincentives for firms, and it was 
those firms that had more capacity in the emergent nonunion sectors that were able to 
avoid these costs by adopting DC plans. 
41  Western’s analysis shows that the growth in services was not a primary cause of the overall 
decline in density. In the 1970s, union density grew in many OECD countries (not including 
America) despite the fact that, in the 1970s, just like in the following decade, manufacturing 
shrank while services grew there too (1997: 151).
42  It does not follow here that 21 percent of all contributions to DC plans were for union work-
ers. Many firms in which some of their workforce was unionized provided separate retirement 
schemes for their top-tier employees, such as those at different levels of management who were 
not affiliated with a union. These employees typically received a DC pension as a supplement 
to a DB one. Also plans can be set up that have both DB and DC features, these are known as a 
hybrid pension plans (McGill et al. 2005).28  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
A spate of statistical studies in the 1980s and 1990s by economists tried to identify the 
core characteristics of the new companies that were adopting DC plans. There is gen-
eral consensus among these studies that the union status, industry status, and the size 
of the firm were the most important determinants for the kind of pension plans that 
were adopted by businesses. They found that employees of large firms were more likely 
to be offered a traditional pension plan than workers at small firms (Hodson 1986), 
that the shift from manufacturing to the services decreased participation in defined-
benefit plans – services being much less likely to provide one (Bloom/Freeman 1992; 
Kruse 1995), and that deunionization in these sectors was a final key factor for the fall 
in DB coverage (Bloom/Freeman 1992). Ippolito notes that “about half of this shift is 
attributable to a loss of employment in large unionized firms where DB plans are used 
intensively” (1995). In short, traditional plans in large unionized firms in the goods-
producing sector lost a significant portion of the total pension plan and participant 
share to DC plans in smaller nonunion firms in the service sector (Ippolito 1995). 
In Table 2, Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) use data from the IRS Form 5500 filings to 
report that, between 1977 and 1985, union status, firm size, and industry status all heav-
ily correlated with the type of plan adopted. What they find of particular interest is found 
in the “using weights” row of the table. The 85.7 percent value in the final column indi-
Table 2  Percentage of employees with a pension in a defined benefit plan, 1977–1985
Year
1977 1981 1985
Union status
Union 97.2 97.6 96.0
Nonunion 82.9 83.7 76.8
Firm size
< 100 employees 84.2 68.6 60.6
100–249 63.8 56.5 45.3
250–499 69.3 63.2 50.9
500–999 77.3 72.4 60.7
1000+ 90.2 90.8 82.2
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 88.0 82.3 65.2
Mining 86.5 86.2 76.3
Construction 91.2 81.3 70.8
Manufacturing 92.2 91.9 86.0
Transportation, communication 92.0 95.8 85.8
Wholesale trade 79.2 72.4 65.1
Retail trade 83.0 78.5 68.3
Finance, insurance, real estate 85.2 83.1 78.5
Services 87.7 81.0 69.9
Using weights
1977 weights 89.7 90.0 85.7
Unweighted
Total plans 89.7 88.0 79.3
Source: Gustman/Steinmeier (1992).McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  29
cates that, if the number of employees in each grouping (union status, firm size, industry 
status) were held at the 1977 distribution, then the percentage would have fallen to 85.7 
percent. This predicts the degree to which the shift is due to the changing industrial 
features of firms or the tendency of a firm with a given union status, size, and industry 
status to change. It is an indicator of how much of the growth in DC plans can be ex-
plained by shifting employment across industries, all other things being equal, and shows 
that about half of the change was probably due to the changing characteristics of firms.
At the end of the 1980s, a commenter on pensions noted that 
the crisis over defined-benefit plans may be losing its momentum due to organic developments 
in the national economy. The shift from heavy industry and manufacturing to high tech and ser-
vices may account for the increasing popularity of defined contribution and Internal Revenue 
Code section 401(k) plans. These plans may be more suitable and attractive for younger, more 
mobile employees in less-traditional, less-unionized occupations. If so, the risk of discourag-
ing defined-benefit growth by tighter insurance regulation may now be that great because the 
natural limits of that growth may already have been reached.43
Throughout the period, neoliberals supported policies that helped them weaken union 
control over multiemployer pension funds at the cost of raising the administrative bur-
den on firms with single-employer plans. For their part, unions with single-employer 
plans supported these regulations as well. However, given structural changes in the 
economy and the weakening of unions, they had the unintended consequence of trig-
gering a business shift out of the traditional pension system altogether.
7 Conclusion
The 1980s are often described as a period of neoliberal restructuring for most capitalist 
countries. Neoliberalism, in practice, has come to be viewed as a repertoire of policies 
that typically include privatization, separation of regulatory authority, the depolitical-
ization of regulatory agencies, liberalization, and the favoring of monetary over fiscal 
policy. However, two competing perspectives have emerged that offer strikingly differ-
ent characterizations of neoliberal policy making. In this paper, I term them the weak 
state intervention thesis and the state-managed transition thesis. The former suggests 
that the neoliberal policy change occurs when policy makers weaken the capacity of the 
state, while the latter suggests that it is a state-managed project, rife with new forms of 
regulation and the creation of new state capacities. Along these lines, in Vogel’s account, 
“more rules” have been necessary to achieve “freer markets” (1996). 
43  Michael S. Gordon. “Policy Forum: Reflections on Selected Issues of Private Pension Regula-
tion.” National Journal. August 11, 1984. AFL-CIO Occupational Safety, Health, and Social Se-
curity. AFL-CIO Collection, 87-0011, Box 10. Unprocessed files..30  MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/12
The rise of 401(k) retirement plans does not fit neatly into either narrative about the 
modality of neoliberal change. Firstly, there were more rules imposed on pension plan 
administrators in the 1970s and 1980s, and secondly, these rules were intended to in-
crease the security of the traditional, DB pension system, not to broker in more DC 
plans. When Congress added Section 401(k) to the tax code in 1978, it was primarily 
concerned with resolving a set of disputes that were related to profit-sharing plans, not 
the private pension system as a whole. The only real mention of the provision in Con-
gress was that it would be “negligible” (Hacker 2006: 118). When the Reagan admin-
istration positively ruled in 1981 on the legality of the provision, even Ted Benna (the 
author of the provision) admits he had no idea about its implications for retirement 
policy (ibid.). Furthermore, much of the congressional debate and legislation in the 
period aimed to make the DB system more secure. Even neoliberals, such as the admin-
istrator appointed by Reagan to enforce the rules, Jeffrey Clayton, worked to shore up 
regulations, albeit to weaken unions. After the passage of ERISA in 1974, Congress regu-
larly passed amendments and new laws that expanded the scope of regulatory oversight. 
They did so on an almost annual basis up to the mid-1990s, when, under the Clinton 
administration, the regulatory regime governing pensions began to be liberalized in 
a manner consistent with the weak state intervention thesis. By this point, however, 
401(k)s were already the retirement plan of choice for American businesses. 
This article argues that this wave of regulations had the unintended consequence of 
triggering a shift to the DC system. New rules worked in such a counterintuitive way 
because of how the policies themselves functioned relative to changes in the balance of 
class forces between businesses and unions. Neoliberalism in the 1980s was not simply 
the weakening of state capacity or a state-managed project. By taking a “hard case,” one 
in which neoliberal policy makers were trying to maintain and expand the security of a 
policy area, this paper suggests that neoliberal rules worked in the way they did in large 
part because of the weakening of the labor movement and despite the conscious inten-
tions of neoliberals themselves. The rise of 401(k) plans are a case of neoliberalism with-
out neoliberals. As union strength in the labor market went into decline, by losing mem-
bers and finding it difficult to organize emergent economic sectors, firms were free to 
choose their own path. In the absence of collective bargaining, new employers saw both 
the increasing regulatory costs associated with adopting a DB plan and the lower risk 
associated with DC plans and thus made the economic decision to embrace the latter.McCarthy: Neoliberalism without Neoliberals  31
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